There are high stakes involved in deciding who is entitled to bail pending appeal. A defendant not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court has confirmed that his conviction is legal. An erroneously convicted defendant who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society that he never owed. On the other hand, society has a compelling 2 interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating individuals who are found guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. Under what circumstances a defendant can obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and the defendant.
Congress has struck the current balance in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Act provides that a defendant is entitled to bail pending appeal 3 when, among other things, he can prove (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community while out on bail and (2) that his appeal will be meritorious enough to raise at least one "substantial question." The 4 circuits unanimously agree that Congress intended to make it more difficult to obtain bail pending appeal when it passed the 1984 Bail Act.
5
But the circuits disagree on how much harder Congress made obtaining bail when it replaced the previous requirement that the defendant's appeal raise a non-frivolous issue with the current requirement that the appeal raise a substantial question. 6 Most courts define a substantial question as a "close question." The 7 Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, defines substantial question more broadly by using the same definition that the phrase was given in a prior incarnation of the standard for bail pending appeal-i.e., as an issue that is "fairly debatable." Courts that have embraced the close question REV. 577, 604-05 & n.175 (2002) (discussing a case in which the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision after reviewing the trial transcript).
13. While court reporters must "promptly" translate the shorthand they took during the relevant proceeding into a transcript after a party requests it, see 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (2000) , that ideal is often not achieved, see United States v. Austin, 768 F.2d 302, 303 (10th Cir. 1985) (McKay, J., dissenting) (noting the reality that court reporters often take months to complete trial transcripts). In one notorious case, a court reporter took four years to complete a partial trial transcript in a criminal case. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 431, 436-37 (1993) (denying the court reporter absolute immunity in a suit for damages).
other hand, the Ninth Circuit resurrected the fairly debatable standard by arguing that Congress intended to use the historical meaning of substantial question. This Article sides with the Ninth Circuit and argues that the 10 fairly debatable standard is the correct standard-an interpretation supported by common sense and a close look at the 1984 Bail Act's legislative history.
The difference between the standards is not merely an academic concern. Many legal questions that are "fairly debatable" are not "close." Defendants can and do fall in that gap. But should we be concerned about 11 such defendants? It might not seem troublesome when a court denies bail to a defendant whose direct appeal will not raise a close question. After all, if we are primarily concerned with defendants who serve prison time only to have their conviction overturned on appeal, why should we care about defendants whose appeal will not raise a single close question? Seemingly by definition those cases will not result in a reversal. The problem lies in the fact that, in practice, motions for bail must be filed soon after sentencing to prevent defendants from having to report to prison at all. That time frame means that defense counsel must quickly research the arguments that will likely be made on appeal and hurriedly draft a motion. And all this work must often be done without the benefit of transcripts-the lifeblood of a defendant's appeal -which can take court 12 reporters several months to complete. As a result, even defendants with 13 highly meritorious appeals might not be able to meet their burden to prove that their appeal will raise a close question.
This Article establishes that Congress was sensitive to this problem and intended that courts use the fairly debatable standard-not the close question standard. The analysis commences in Part II with an examination of the three incarnations of the bail-pending-appeal standard that led up to 1984. Examining those three periods provides the necessary context for understanding what Congress did when it passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Part III provides a brief overview of the current standard for bail 2008] ACT OF 1984? 829 14. Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955 pending appeal. The Part focuses on the incipiency of the circuit split that developed regarding the meaning of substantial question. Part IV then takes advantage of the historical lessons learned in Part II to establish that Congress intended for courts to use the historical definition of substantial question.
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II. BAIL PENDING APPEAL FROM 1879 UNTIL 1984 "Bail," Justice Douglas famously wrote, "is basic to our system of law." Bail symbolizes the country's bedrock concern for personal 14 freedom and the idea incorporated from English common law that "only those incarcerations which arise from absolute necessity are just." 15 Indeed, ever since Congress granted federal appellate courts jurisdiction over criminal cases in 1879, defendants have had the ability to obtain bail pending appeal under at least some circumstances.
16
This Part will examine those circumstances and how they changed from 1879 to 1984. Those 105 years can be neatly divided into three distinct 17 periods: 1879 to 1934, 1934 to 1956, and 1956 to 1984 . The most fruitful way to examine those periods is to view the way in which the three primary components of the standard for bail pending appeal changed. Those components are:
•The merit requirement. This requirement deals with whether the defendant's appeal must raise a non-frivolous issue, a substantial question, or something else to entitle the defendant to bail pending appeal.
•The burden-of-proof requirement. This requirement deals with whether the defendant has the burden to prove he has met the merit requirement or whether the government has the burden to prove that the defendant has not met the merit requirement.
•The character requirement. This requirement encompasses whether the defendant can be denied bail based on character issues, such as danger to the community or flight risk.
As will become clear, the legislature and judiciary have, over time, adjusted these requirements to find the right blend to balance the individual's liberty interest against the community's interest in safety. 
A. 1879-1934
Starting in 1879, when federal appellate courts were first granted jurisdiction over writs of error in all federal criminal cases, Congress provided that when such a writ was taken, "'bail may . . . be taken. '" 18 Twelve years later, the U.S. Supreme Court re-crafted the standard. The new, equally nebulous test provided that:
Where such writ of error is allowed in the case of a conviction of an infamous crime, or in any other criminal case in which [the writ] will lie . . . the circuit court or district court, or any justice or judge thereof, shall have power, . . . to admit the accused to bail in such amount as may be fixed.
19
The Supreme Court explained an oft-repeated rationale for the rule: " [A] person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment . . . ."
20
Over time, the concept of a merit requirement implicit in the standard took hold. Most courts, in practice, asked whether the appeal would present any non-frivolous issues. If the defendant's appeal would raise 21 a non-frivolous issue for the appellate court to decide, he would be entitled to bail. But since the statute was silent on a merit requirement, no 22 uniform standard emerged. The Second Circuit, for example, required the defendant to have a "reasonable chance of success" in his appeal. The
23
Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, seemed to believe that no merit requirement existed and that as long as the defendant did not pose a flight risk, bail pending appeal was mandatory. Courts also disagreed on the 24 precise scope of the character requirement. ACT OF 1984? 831 26. Debra L. Leibowitz, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of 'Substantial Question' Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 , 54 FORDHAM L. REV 1081 , 1084 -85 (1986 (noting that the 1891 statute placed the "burden of demonstrating frivolousness on the government" and that it marked the "first step toward making a merit [o] rious appeal a prerequisite for release").
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27. Duker, supra note 15, at 115 (citing United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.N.J. 1934) All courts agreed, however, that the government bore the burden to prove that the defendant was not entitled to bail. This position reversed 26 the common law standard that placed the burden on the defendant.
27
Flipping the burden back and forth between the government and the defendant is a notable (but often unnoticed) theme in the history of bail pending appeal and a common technique to either restrict or expand access to bail pending appeal-during times when bail was disfavored, the defendant shouldered the burden, whereas during times when bail was favored, the government bore it.
The period from 1879-1934 was no exception, as many courts recognized that in most cases defendants ought to be granted bail pending appeal; as one court explained it: "[A]ccused and convicted persons under ordinary circumstances and in the vast majority of cases should be admitted to bail, both before their conviction and during the pendency of their writs of error until the appellate court has affirmed the judgments against them." The court further explained that this rule reflected the idea 28 that a defendant who is denied bail pending appeal and has his conviction reversed suffers the "same injustice" as a defendant who is imprisoned before trial and is subsequently acquitted; Congress had enacted a lenient standard to "prevent just such imprisonment." 29 B. 1934-1956 In 1934, the mishmash of rules that had evolved under the prior standard gave way to a clearer, more restrictive rule. Apparently unhappy with the lenient attitude reflected in the old standard, the Supreme Court (pursuant to its rule-making authority) limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would raise "'a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court. Courts interpreted the standard as placing a threshold requirement on the defendant to prove that his appeal would raise a substantial question.
31
Once the defendant jumped that hurdle, the court had discretion to determine whether bail was appropriate. Whether the defendant was a 32 flight risk or a danger to the community could then be considered. But 33 "the legal merit of the question presented to the appellate court [was] the primary consideration in determining whether bail should be granted," and many reported bail decisions discussed only whether the defendant's appeal had sufficient merit to warrant bail. Changing the merit requirement to "substantial question" was a welcome relief for some who saw the prior non-frivolous issue standard as too lax. U.S. District Court Judge Holtzoff, for example, concluded that the purpose of the change was to "restrict" the number of convicted defendants eligible for bail and that the prior law's broad presumption in favor of bail was a "serious defect in the administration of criminal justice." Unfortunately for Judge Holtzoff, this period of "tough on bail" 39 would last only 22 years.
C. 1956-1984
In 1956, Congress once again approved a change to the standard for bail pending appeal, dramatically expanding the pool of defendants eligible for bail. The new standard provided that " [b] ail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." The standard was re-codified in the Bail Reform Act . . who has been convicted of an offense and is either awaiting sentence or has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 3146 unless the court or judge has reason to believe that one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. If such a risk of flight or danger is believed to exist, or if it appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for delay, the person may be ordered detained."); see also 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 767 (3d ed. 2004) ("Even before 1966, at a time when the rule was silent on the subject, courts had considered that they could deny bail pending appeal to a defendant who was likely to flee or who posed a danger to the community . . . ."). For a discussion of the 1966 Bail Act, see Note, The Bail Reform Act of 1966 , 53 IOWA L. REV. 170, 177-88 (1967 , 275 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1960 ) ("Although the most important factor to consider is whether the appeal is frivolous, there are other considerations which may justify the denial of bail pending appeal both under the old and new rules. The one most often mentioned is the likelihood of the defendant absconding." (footnote omitted)); see also Duker, supra note 15, at 117-18 (listing the various factors courts took into consideration).
45. See Duker, supra note 15, at 118 (emphasis added) (citing Rhodes, 275 F.2d at 81). 46. Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice 1962) (noting that if the government cannot prove the defendant's direct appeal will raise only frivolous issues, bail should only be denied "in cases in which, from substantial evidence, it seems clear that the right to bail may be abused or the community may be threatened by the applicant's release"); see also Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968) (concluding that bail pending appeal should be denied only when the defendant posed the "kind of danger that so jeopardizes the public" that detaining him is the only option).
47. See FED. R. APP. P. 9(c) (1972) ("The decision as to release pending appeal shall be made in accordance with [The Bail Reform Act of 1966] . The burden of establishing that the defendant will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the defendant.").
defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community. 41 Courts observed that once again the burden had flipped: the government now bore the burden to prove that the defendant was not entitled to bail. And the merit requirement once again required the 42 government to prove that any appeal would be frivolous.
43
As with prior law, the frivolity of the appeal was only a threshold condition. The government could also rely on a character requirement to prevent defendants from obtaining bail. But, at least initially, the REV. 275, 284-85 (1979) (noting the tension and resolving it by arguing that the "principles of the [1966] Bail Reform Act should govern" if the direct appeal is "substantial," but that the principles inherent in placing the burden on the defendant to prove he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk should apply if the defendant's appeal is "insubstantial").
48 The Government commendably acknowledges that the new Rule has made an important change. The Rule expresses a general attitude, the significance of which is that inasmuch as an appeal from a conviction is a matter of right, the risk of incarceration for a conviction that may be upset is normally to be guarded against by allowing bail unless the appeal is so baseless as to deserve to be condemned as "frivolous" or is sought as a device for mere delay. REV. 929, 930 (1985) (noting the need for detention if defendants were "community safety hazards"); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3185 ("Many of the changes in the Bail Reform Act incorporated in this bill reflect the Committee's determination that Federal Bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release and must give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released."). was public concern about crimes committed by those out on bail, and most of the legislation changed bail practice with respect to defendants likely to re-offend.
56
For present purposes, the most pertinent portion of the 1984 Bail Act altered the standard for bail pending appeal. Congress wanted to change the standard not only to address general public fears about crime, but also to address a concern specific to appeals. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 1985 ) ("We also agree with the other circuits that the language in the statute which reads 'likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial' is a requirement that the claimed error not be harmless or unprejudicial.").
68. See cases cited infra note 82. 69. In 1990, Congress amended the 1984 Bail Reform Act to clarify that bail pending appeal was also appropriate not only when the substantial question would likely result in a reversal or an order for a new trial, but also in cases where it would likely result in a "sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment" or a "reduced sentence . . . less than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal process." See United States v. Chang, No. 90-0533-01, 1992 WL 2417, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1992) (noting that the change occurred in 1990). required that the substantial question was "'likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.'" The court rejected the meaning the district 62 court assigned to it: that a district court must conclude that its own rulings were likely to be reversed. The court was "unwilling to attribute to 63 Congress the cynicism" that a district court judge could grant bail pending appeal only if it believed it were likely to be reversed-something that would presumably never happen. The Miller court also found that 64 defining the phrase in that way would render the "substantial question" portion of the statute superfluous: any question likely to result in reversal would necessarily be a substantial question. Thus, the court sensibly 65 interpreted the phrase to require the district court to determine whether, if the substantial question were decided in the defendant's favor, it would likely result in a reversal or an order for a new trial. For example, even 66 if the substantial question were decided in the defendant's favor, it might be harmless error, in which case the defendant would not be entitled to bail because the conviction would not be overturned.
67
Following Miller, the other circuits unanimously agreed that the 1984 Bail Act required them to go through the two-step process: they were to ACT OF 1984 ? 839 70. 754 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1985 85, 89 (3d Cir. 1986 ). In Smith, the Third Circuit recognized "that a number of courts of appeals view our Miller definition as incomplete." Id. It responded to these objections "by refer [ring] to the requirement that a question which is not governed by controlling precedent nonetheless must be significant. Clearly, an issue that is 'patently without merit' cannot qualify as significant." Id. The court concluded by seemingly abandoning the approach laid out in Miller and siding with the Ninth Circuit: "Where there is any doubt as to significance, we believe it is preferable to resort to the historical approach outlined in . . . Handy, rather than to the 'close' question concept advocated by the Giancola court." Id. (citation omitted); see also The state of the law on the meaning of "substantial question" has not changed since. On one side of the road sits the Ninth Circuit. On the other side sits every other circuit except for the Third Circuit, which sits in the road near the Ninth Circuit's curb.
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IV. CONGRESS INTENDED THAT COURTS INTERPRET A "SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION" AS A "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" ISSUE
This Article now turns to why the Ninth Circuit is correct. This Part first discusses the concerns that led to bail reform-concerns that had nothing to do with the merit requirement. This Part next explores the legal consequences of Congress's decision to fashion a merit requirement by using a phrase-a "substantial question"-that has a well-settled meaning and history. The most salient consequence is that courts must presume that Congress intended to use the settled definition unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Finally, this Part addresses the arguments that Congress did not intend courts to interpret a substantial question as a fairly debatable issue. Those arguments face two obstacles: first, the improbability that Congress intended to dramatically alter the merit requirement given that its expressed concerns addressed only the character and burden-of-proof requirements; and second, the strong legal presumption that Congress intends to import a phrase's well-settled meaning. This Part then concludes that those contrary arguments marshal insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the historical definition of a "substantial question" as being fairly debatable.
A. The Motivation Driving Bail Reform Had Nothing to Do with the Merit Requirement
In passing the 1984 Bail Act, Congress wanted to reduce the public's anxiety about rising crimes rates by ensuring that those free on bail were not prone to committing more crimes. Because convictions are presumed correct on appeal, Congress also wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail pending appeal. And in responding to these concerns, as the 85 Eight Circuit "bluntly" explained it, "Congress [intended] that fewer convicted persons remain at large while pursuing their appeals." History 86 demonstrates how Congress responded both to the concern about rising crime rates-by placing an unprecedented burden on the defendant to prove he will not be a danger to the community-and the concern about Later, in 1990, Congress further underscored the concern for public safety by passing the Mandatory Detention Act, which prevented defendants convicted of certain categories of dangerous crimes from being eligible for bail pending appeal without "exceptional reasons" being present. 18 U.S.C. § § 3143(b)(2), 3145(c) (2000) . The Act provides that violent offenders, in addition to those convicted of drug offenses with a maximum sentence of at least ten years and those convicted of any offense with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death, are not eligible for release unless "it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why [their] detention would not be appropriate." Id. § § 3145(c), 3145(f). The exceptional-reasons requirement must be met in addition to the requirements defendants must normally meet to be entitled to bail pending appeal. United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1991) . For a look at how courts have interpreted the "exceptional reasons" requirement, see Jonathan S. Rosen, An Examination of the "Exceptional Reasons" Jurisprudence of the Mandatory Detention Act: Title 18 U.S.C. § § 3143, 3145(c), 19 VT. L. REV. 19, 25-45 (1994) .
90. See cases cited supra note 46.
reversing the presumption in favor of bail-by placing the burden on the defendant to prove that his appeal will raise a meritorious issue. Neither of these concerns had anything to do with restricting the level of merit that the defendant would have to prove his appeal will raise.
Congress's Prime Motivation in Restricting Bail Pending Appeal Related to the Character Requirement
In altering the standard for bail pending appeal, Congress was reacting to public concerns about "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release." Recall that only a small portion of the 1984 Bail 87 Reform Act was aimed at altering the standard for bail pending appeal-most of the Act thoroughly overhauled general bail practice to give judges the tools to keep defendants who were likely to re-offend off the streets. As one judge summarized it: "The whole tenor of the 1984 [Bail Act] addresses the problems of safety of the community or of other persons . . . ." Congress saw the shift in focus to public safety concerns 88 as a "significant departure" from prior bail law, which centered solely on concerns about assuring the "appearance of the defendant at judicial proceedings." 89 Given this backdrop, Congress unsurprisingly was dissatisfied with the character requirement in the standard for bail pending appeal. A mere 12 years before Congress passed the 1984 Bail Act, criminals who were threats to public safety would not necessarily be denied bail pending appeal-the government had to prove that they were clear threats. Even ACT OF 1984? 843 91. See supra text accompanying note 47 (noting that a defendant only had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community); see also United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting the need for a great threat to the community to warrant denial of bail). released on bail if he could prove that he was likely not a threat to the community. Because of Congress's dissatisfaction, the 1984 Bail Act 91 swept aside the prior character requirement to make way for an unprecedented standard-that defendants would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were not a threat to the community.
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92
In the previous one-hundress-plus years of bail-pending-appeal standards, defendants had never had to meet such an onerous burden. But courts, in deciding how to interpret the 1984 Bail Act, seem completely unaware of these facts. The Eighth Circuit, for example, noted that Congress would not have gone through "the trouble" of passing bail reform if it knew courts would use the fairly debatable standard as opposed to the close question standard. This line of reasoning makes no sense in 93 light of the evidence that Congress's primary concern was public safety-not a concern that defendants with meritless appeals were being let out on bail. Moreover, in light of these facts, a prime argument used to justify the close question standard falters: namely, that the fairly debatable standard does not adequately limit, to the extent Congress intended, the number of defendants out on bail pending appeal. The hidden assumption is that Congress altered only the merit requirement to reach its desired reduction in those out on bail. But that assumption is not correct. Congress intended to place an important limit on defendants seeking bail by altering the character requirement, which placed a new and unprecedented burden on defendants. 98. In fact, in selecting the close question standard, the only legislative history courts often cited was the fact that Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail, thus seeming to indicate that this piece of legislative history supported use of the close question standard. The Eleventh Circuit, for example-the originator of the close question standard-endorsed this flawed reasoning. See United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail that existed under prior law). Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, in choosing the close question standard over the fairly debatable standard, quotes from the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of the fact that Congress wished to "reverse the presumption in favor of bail," but offers no indication of why it would chose one standard over another. See United States v. Valera-Elizondo, 761 F.2d 1020 , 1023 (5th Cir. 1985 ; see also United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 952 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that the 1984 Bail Act "was intended to reverse the presumption in favor of bail pending appeal under the former law and to make the standards for granting bail pending appeal more stringent"). It has been held that although denial of bail after conviction is frequently justified, the current statute incorporates a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction. It is the presumption that the Committee wishes to eliminate . . . . . . . . Once guilt of a crime has been established in a court of law, there is no reason to favor release pending imposition of sentence or appeal. The conviction, in which the defendant's guilt of a crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, is presumptively correct in law.
97
Courts have, at times, cited the fact that Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail pending appeal in its discussion of how to define a "substantial question," thus signaling their belief that the two are related. The D.C. Circuit, for example, inferred such a connection: "We 98 adopt [the close question standard, the] more demanding standard, because it appears better to accord with the expressed congressional intent to increase the required showing on the part of the defendant. The law has shifted from a presumption of release to a presumption of valid conviction." The court offered no other reason to select one standard over 99 the other.
On its face, however, the legislative history cited above plainly addresses the issue of who carries the burden on the bail motion-nothing more. Under the standard used before 1984, the government had the 100 burden to prove that the defendant was not entitled to bail pending appeal. The legislative history takes issue with that burden allocation, 114 . Id. at 303 (McKay, J., dissenting). 115. United States v. Austin (Austin II), 614 F. Supp. 1208 Supp. , 1220 Supp. , 1222 Supp. (D.N.M. 1985 v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013 , 1016 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003 . Thus, it is difficult to know how many defendants are denied bail on the basis that their appeal will not raise a close question, only to have their convictions reversed on appeal. But what is possible to know is that Austin is not the only defendant to meet that description. For example, in United States v. Thompson, the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction of Georgia Thompson, finding that the alleged crime she had committed (essentially, she departed from state administrative rules for politically motivated reasons) was not a federal crime at all. 484 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2007) . But even though the Seventh Circuit took the unusual step at oral argument of ordering Thompson to be immediately released from prison, she had already spent approximately six months (of her eighteen-month sentence) in jail, as she had been denied bail pending appeal. See id. (noting that the court ordered the defendant released at oral argument); see also United States v. Thompson, No. 06-CR-20, slip op. (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2006 ) (order denying bail pending appeal). Likewise, in United States v. Santos, the district court denied bail to Miriam Santos (Chicago's city treasurer), holding that the that the defendant carried the heavy burden to prove that his appeal would raise a close question, but was given neither the time nor the necessary resources (i.e., trial transcripts) to meet that burden:
The government . . . makes a big issue of the absence of a transcript to support the [defendant's] claims. When one considers the time constraints involved in this and in future cases, that is of course the necessary result. This court will be considering [motions for bail] in the absence of adequate information. If not so serious, it would be laughable to excuse this on the ground that the burden of supplying these necessities lies on the person seeking bail pending appeal. We ourselves have had to discipline some court reporters in cases because of months of delay in preparing transcripts. Even if court reporters were prompt, the time constraints obvious in this and future cases make the task of appellants' seeking bail pending appeal one which I cannot conclude meets the minimum standards of due process.
114
On remand, the district court denied Austin bail, holding that even though he was not a flight risk or a danger to the community, he could not show that his sufficiency challenge was a "close question." Austin was errors she claimed in her corruption trial were not "close questions." 65 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1999) . Later, the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the district court judge made a "litany of errors," including rulings involving important evidentiary matters. United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 965 (7th Cir. 2000 Seegers, 433 F.2d 493, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1970 ) (granting a defendant bail pending appeal, when then-current law dictated a presumption in favor of bail, even though the defendant had not yet received a copy of the trial transcripts, and defense counsel could only tentatively list three questions that might result in reversal).
121. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U. S. 677, 696-97 (1979 ). 122. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911 here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (refusing to extend insider trading sanctions to non-traders because doing so would be a radical departure from prior law and the Court would not assume Congress intended such a massive change "absent some explicit evidence" of such an intent); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[W] here . . . Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.").
importance of the placement of the burden on a bail motion and on the pitfalls of requiring the defendant to prove that his appeal will raise a close question instead of a fairly debatable one.
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With the key motivators that led to bail reform in 1984 in mind, the analysis now turns to Congress's decision to require defendants seeking bail to prove that their direct appeal will raise a "substantial question."
B. Courts Should Presume That Congress Intended to Revive the Historical Definition of Substantial Question
As a matter of common sense, it would be odd if Congress were to resurrect a phrase with a settled legal meaning but silently expect courts to assign an entirely new meaning to that phrase. This observation is particularly true when the phrase's prior meaning arose in an earlier version of the same standard in which it now appears. If Congress wanted to give the phrase a new meaning, why would it use a phrase with a long pedigree? At the very least, we should expect Congress to clearly express its desire to courts that it wanted to depart from a well-established meaning of a phrase.
Unsurprisingly, courts do indeed recognize these principles of interpretation. Courts assume that "our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." If Congress crafts a statute using words with a 121 "well-known meaning," courts presume Congress intended to use that meaning "unless the context compels to the contrary." This is true even ACT OF 1984? 849 123. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) ("When . . . judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well."); see also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580 ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.").
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124. Cf. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22:33 (6th ed. 2002) ("[T] he legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of the original act, and if words or provisions in the act or section amended that had been previously construed are repeated in the amendment, it is held that the legislature adopted the prior construction of the word or provision.").
125 
C. Arguments in Favor of the Close Question Standard are Unconvincing
Although no court that adopted the close questions standard mentioned any sort of presumption in favor of using the historical definition, some courts did offer a substantive reason for not adopting the fairly debatable standard: use of the standard would not restrict bail pending appeal as much as Congress would have wanted. Thus, we can charitably 129 reinterpret their argument as follows: that while it makes sense to presume that Congress intended to use the settled meaning of substantial question, Congress made it clear that it intended to supplant the prior definition with something more strict. This argument, however, still must be tempered by the fact that there are strong reasons to believe that Congress did not intend to significantly deviate from the settled definition of substantial question, given that its primary concerns with the prior standard related solely to the character and burden-of-proof requirements-not the merit requirement. Given all of this, was Congress's intent to abandon the fairly debatable standard clear?
The answer is a resounding no. As a threshold issue, the sentences typically plucked from the 1984 Bail Act's legislative history to support use of the close question standard-sentences that note Congress wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail-have nothing to do with how courts are to interpret "substantial question." As explained above, they Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985) (alteration in original) (quoting the D.C. Bail Act's legislative history, H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 186-87 (1970) has said that when deciding whether Congress intended to use the settled meaning of a phrase, courts should look only to "the text or structure" of the statute at issue-trying to find such an intent from examining other statues is forbidden. Finally, this argument cannot overcome the conclusion that Congress expected courts to apply the settled definition of substantial question in interpreting the 1984 Bail Act. Why would Congress expect courts to interpret "substantial question" differently when the phrase had appeared previously in the same exact standard? And if Congress did have such an intention, why didn't it say so somewhere-either in the statute itself by providing another definition, or in the legislative history?
Courts should take Congress at its word. It was concerned about crime, so it placed an unprecedented burden on defendants to prove that they are not a danger to the community. And it wanted to reverse the presumption in favor of bail that existed under prior law, so it placed the burden on the defendant to prove he was entitled to bail and took the burden from the government. But Congress did not intend to apply a radically stricter merit requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
A powerful case supports the Ninth Circuit's position that when Congress in 1984 required defendants to prove that their direct appeal would raise a "substantial question," it intended defendants to establish that their direct appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue. Nevertheless, every other circuit except the Ninth Circuit (and arguably the Third Circuit) has come to a different conclusion, creating a circuit split that has lasted more than twenty years. Typically a split pitting the Ninth Circuit-in a Judge Reinhardt decision-against the other circuits would scream "cert worthy!" But even though the split has existed for some time, and affects so many cases, the issue has evaded high court review. It is 157 time for the Supreme Court to step in and resolve the dispute. In the meantime, some defendants will serve prison time only to have their convictions overturned on appeal. The defendant will suffer unjustified prison time-at taxpayer expense-to pay a debt to society that he did not owe.
